Feudalism and Political Stability
To formalize the intuition presented in Section 3.3 using a simple framework, suppose that a perfectly myopic, risk-neutral sovereign imperfectly controls a polity that creates output of size one each period. Denote by γ the amount of land controlled by the military regardless of the actions of the sovereign (this can be interpreted as the percentage of the entire polity controlled by the military). Suppose that there are N perfectly myopic, risk-neutral members of the military (where N is sufficiently large) and that γ is evenly distributed between the members of this class. We consider the parameter value γ exogenously given. A value of γ = 0 corresponds to a perfectly absolutist sovereign (who uses mamluks or mercenaries to staff his military) whereas higher values of γ denote more feudal arrangements. Note that our assumption of perfectly myopic agents allows us to abstract from the potentially important issue of how the sovereign compensates the military (i.e., iqta' rents versus land grants). 1 In addition, we abstract from other important issues in order to focus on the sovereign's desire to prevent a successful revolt. We do so in order to highlight one mechanism that we believe contributes to the observed increase in ruler duration.
The order of play in the game is as follows: after observing γ the sovereign moves first and decides whether to keep the entire amount of output he controls to himself or whether to divide it equally between himself and the military. Once the sovereign makes this decision, the military observes both γ and the decision of the sovereign. After observing this information, the military decides whether to revolt or not. If the military revolts, the revolt will succeed with probability π ∈ (0, 1), which is exogenously given. If a revolt is undertaken and succeeds, the sovereign gets nothing and the military get 1 N each. If it does not succeed the sovereign gets 1 and the military gets nothing. If revolt is not undertaken the payoffs (sovereign, military) are ( 1−γ N +1 , γ N + 1−γ N +1 ) if the sovereign shares, and (1 − γ, γ N ) if he does not. Let σ S = {s} be the actions taken by the sovereign (share, not share). Similarly σ M = {r(s)} are the actions of the military (revolt, not revolt). We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium using backwards induction (we assume that if indifferent the military does not revolt). First, note that if the sovereign shares, the military will never revolt since π N < γ N + 1−γ N +1 when N is large. If the sovereign does not share, the military will revolt if and only if π > γ. We call this point the "mamluk cutoff" since it implies that the probability of successful revolt is higher than the proportion of land controlled by the military. With these conditions we state the following:
Proposition: There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium {σ S ,σ M } is the game described above in which: i. if the "mamluk cutoff" holds, the sovereign will not share and the military will revolt. The revolt will succeed with probability π. ii. if the "mamluk cutoff" does not hold, then the sovereign will not share and the military will not revolt.
The drop in the probability of a successful rebellion as we move from mamluk (i.e., absolutist) to feudal arrangements is driven by the military obtaining more land. As this group obtains a higher endowment they have more to lose from an unsuccessful rebellion. Once the mamluk cutoff is reached, they find it optimal to retain what they have instead of trying to overthrow the sovereign. In this framework, the sovereign never finds it optimal to share because the military is large. This suggests why a myopic sovereign would never voluntarily move from a mamluk to a feudal framework. In so doing, he would greatly reduce his income. 2
Additional Results
Here we discuss additional empirical results referenced in the text.
Japanese Feudalism
To investigate the extent to which the emergence of feudalism led to an increase in ruler duration in Japan, we use data on ruler duration provided by Morby (1989, pp. 223-227) 3 and again calculate the Quandt Likelihod Ratio (QLR) statistic for the specification:
We use 15% trimming and find that the F-statistic testing the null-hypothesis that both β 1 and β 3 are zero is maximized in the year 1142 CE. In this year, the F-statistic is 6.93 well above the 5% cutoff of 5.86 but below the 1% cutoff of 7.78. In other words, the data identifies a break in ruler duration in Japan in the year 1142 CE at the 5% significance level. As noted in the text this date approximately corresponds to the emergence of Japanese feudal institutions.
Appendix Figure 1 presents the results in graphical form. The upper graph shows mean ruler duration in each year (denoted with grey dots) and the fitted values of Equation (1) with the break date in the year 1142 CE. The lower graph plots the F-statistic within the central 70% of the sample. The vertical line denotes the estimated break date in 1142 CE. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that Japanese feudalism led to a long-run increase in ruler durations.
Regression Results for Probability of Ruler Being Deposed
Does divergence in ruler duration reflect a change in political stability? And what do we know about the method of exit for the monarchs examined? We explore these questions by constructing a dummy variable deposed itc equal to one if Morby (1989) identifies a ruler as having been deposed. Morby (1989) defines deposition as removal by conquest or overthrow. Although our baseline dataset relies on Bosworth (1996) for data on ruler duration in the Islamic world, Morby (1989) also reports information on duration and overthrow for a number of Muslim polities. We make use of that information here.
In Column (1) of Appendix Table 1 , we present the results of Equation (1) of the main text using the dummy variable deposed itc in place of duration itc . The overall trend is consistent with results observed with ruler duration. After around 1000 CE, rulers in Western Europe are significantly less likely to be deposed than their Muslim counterparts.
Regression Results Related to State Size
One might be concerned that Islamic polities were larger than European polities and that there is a negative relationship between state size and ruler duration. In addition to including state size as a control in the main text, here we show that there is not a systematic relationship between state size and ruler duration in our sample after 1000 CE. To do this, we use the entire Nüssli sample and estimate a regression of the form:
where Area i is the area of the polity in which ruler i assumed power measured in 100,000 squared kilometers. The estimatesα c are presented in Column (2) of Appendix Table 1 . These results show that after 1000 CE one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between state size and ruler duration.
Data Set Construction
The geographic covariates were constructed as follows: the area of the political entity at the start of the century, the proportion of an entity's area that was part of the Roman Empire in 100 CE and the latitude of the centroid of the political entity were constructed using ArcGIS and Nüssli (2011). The average agricultural suitability of a political entity was constructed using the raw data available at http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata, ranges between 0 and 1 and is described in detail in Michalopoulos (2012) . The percentage of an entity's area that belonged to the Carolingian Empire in 800 CE was also calculated using ArcGIS and shapefiles in Nüssli (2011). The parliament data in van Zanden et al. (2012) and Stasavage (2011) were matched to the sovereign states in Nüssli (2011) and to the Bosworth/Morby data set. The exact mapping is provided in Appendix Tables 2-4. Appendix Tables 5-20 provide a comprehensive overview of the construction of the two data sets used in the empirical analysis. In Appendix Tables 5-12 we provide details regarding the   construction of the Nüssli data set whereas in Appendix Tables 13-20 we explain the construction  of the Bosworth-Morby data set.  Appendix Tables 5-12 provide all of the sovereign states denoted in Nüssli's (2011) shape files from 700 through 1400 CE. The political entities for which we were able to find at least one ruler duration for a ruler assuming power on the interval [t,t+100) are highlighted in bold. The number of rulers who assumed power on the interval are given in the first entry in parentheses whereas the average duration of these rulers in years is given in the second entry. 4 Appendix Tables 13-20 provide the dynasties in the Bosworth/Morby data set by one-hundred year intervals. In compiling the data sets, we have included all dynasties in which at least one ruler assumed power prior to 1500 CE. 5 Bosworth, Clifford. 1996 The sources for each identified ruler are provided in the Nüssli dataset. 5 In the Bosworth data set we have omitted a few dynasties that were not Muslim. These are: the Dayubid Ispahbadhs (Bosworth 1996, p. 162) , the Bawandid Ispahbadhs before 839 CE (Bosworth 1996, p. 165) , the Justanids before 805 (Bosworth 1996, p. 145) , the Il Khanids before 1295 (Bosworth 1996, p. 251) , the Line of Batu'ids (The Khans of the Golden Horde), the Line of Orda (The Khans of the Golden Horde) before 1313 CE (Bosworth 1996, p. 253) and the Mongol Great Khans (Bosworth 1996, p. 246) . We have also omitted the Tahirids and Mus'abids who were "not a separate dynasty" (Bosworth 1996, p. 169) . We also exclude rulers of Genoa and Venice in both the Nüssli and Bosworth-Morby data sets. These leaders represented an atypical form of medieval rule since they were not part of a dynastic chain, but rather elected to office. The unusual nature of this framework is demonstrated by the average age of the election of the Doge of Venice. At 72, this is much higher (at times double) than the average age of Europe's princes (Finlay 1980, p. 125) . It should be noted that although we have excluded these dynasties for consistency their inclusion does not affect the qualitative implications of the results. Notes: Dynasties in Western Europe with at least one ruler assuming power on the interval [t,t+100) are provided in the column denoted Western Europe. The mean duration of these rulers is provide in the row denoted mean and the number of these rulers is provided in parentheses. Notes: Dynasties in Western Europe with at least one ruler assuming power on the interval [t,t+100) are provided in the column denoted Western Europe whereas Islamic dynasties are provided in the column marked Islam. The mean duration of these rulers is provide in the row denoted mean and the number of these rulers is provided in parentheses. The 'Annazids Carolingian House (The Holy Roman Empire)
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